Poland, 1982, November, Committee in Support of Solidarity Report No. 9

Committee in Support of Solidarity Reports
Issue No. 9
November 25, 1982

IN THIS ISSUE

The November Strike page 1

Why the Strike Failed page 2

Statement of the Gdansk Coordinating Commission of Solidarity explains why the protest actions called for November 10 did not succeed.

"An Unprecedented Act in the History of Civilized Societies" page 4

The T.K.K. responds to the delegalization of Solidarity

"The Aim of the Law is to Create a Legal Basis for Repression" page 5

In June, the T.K.K. issued a protest against the proposed "anti-parasite" law, adopted October 25.

Why I Am Returning to Poland page 7

One day before returning to Poland, Jan Jozef Lipski, charged with treason, explains why he returned to face arrest and a possible sentence of death.

Thoughts on a Dialogue With the Terrorist page 10

Maciej Poleski, writing in Mazowsze Weekly, gives advice on how to deal with terrorism, the terrorism of the communist-military junta.

These items are the most recent that the Committee in Support of Solidarity has published through the date of this report.

For back reports, contact the Committee, specifying dates, titles, or subjects if possible.

To regularly receive Committee in Support of Solidarity REPORTS, please write to the address below. Donations to cover the cost of preparing and mailing these reports are appreciated.

275 Seventh Avenue, 25th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10001

(212) 989-0909

The Committee in Support of Solidarity, based in New York, organizes efforts on behalf of the Solidarity movement in Poland and for general human rights for the Polish people.

One of the Committee's most important activities is to report information about the situation in Poland, which is gathered from underground Solidarity publications in Poland; the official Polish press; interviews with Polish citizens and foreign travelers who have been allowed to leave Poland; and Solidarity sources in Poland and in Europe.

The Committee in Support of Solidarity makes this information available in regular reports appearing weekly or biweekly, including press advisories and Polish-language bulletins; in editions of a quarterly journal, the Solidarnosc Bulletin; and in special reports describing and analyzing different aspects of the situation in Poland.

The Committee also:

* provides spokesmen to the press, television, and radio, and to meetings and seminars of colleges, unions, and community groups;

* maintains lists of the interned and arrested in Poland;

* advises humanitarian organizations on aiding the Polish people;

* advises private and official human rights organizations about the situation in Poland;

* prepares and delivers briefs and other testimony on the situation in Poland to the government and the Congress of the United States and to international bodies and private institutions;

* maintains public attention on the Polish situation through the sales of "Solidarnosc" T-shirts, stickers, and posters.

To get in touch with the Committee in Support of Solidarity about helping in its work, or with questions, information, or donations, please write: The Committee in Support of Solidarity

Twenty-fifth floor

275 Seventh Avenue

New York, New York 10001

or telephone (212) 989-0909. The press can call (212) 929-6966.

page 1

THE NOVEMBER STRIKE

October 23--The Temporary Coordinating Commission calls for a new wave of walkouts and shutdowns and renews its call for a four hour nationwide general strike on November 10.

October 25--In a continued wave of legislation designed to institute martial law into Poland's official statutes, the Polish Parliament adopts an "anti-parasite" law for "notorious job shirkers" that allows the arrest and forcible draft of anyone unemployed for three months or who cannot prove employment. The law is designed to repress those fired from work and prevented from gaining employment for their union activities or sympathies. Common to the Soviet Union and bloc countries, it is the first such law in Poland.

In a letter to the Parliament's deputies, the Church officially protested the impending adoption of the law and urged its rejection.

October 26--At a meeting of the Central Committee of the PUWP, officials concede that the Polish economy is in an "unprecedented breakdown." Jaruzelski asks the committee to "come up with solutions."

November 10--On the day of planned nationwide strikes and demonstrations, most cities are quiet; however, ten thousand workers demonstrate in Nowa Huta and Wroclaw and demonstrations also take place in Warsaw. Elaborate preparations by the ZOMO police, including the stationing of patrols inside the factories, intimidate workers at many factories.

Information is not available from many parts of Poland. However, one official report admitted to 800 arrests from twenty nine striking factories in two cities alone.

Preventive internments and arrests are estimated to have rounded up over one thousand people.

November 13--It is announced that Lech Walesa has been released. He is not seen for thirty six hours.

November 15--Lech Walesa arrives in Gdansk to a crowd of 1,500 well-wishers. He states that he will not turn back on the promises of August 1980 and that he will not be brought "to his knees."

page 2

WHY THE STRIKE FAILED

[On November 12, 1982, the Regional Coordinating Commission (R.K.W.) of the Gdansk Region issued a statement on the reasons why the strike called for November 10 by the Temporary Coordinating Commission to protest the dissolution of Solidarity did not succeed as planned. The members of the R.K.W. are Bogdan Lis, also a member of the Temporary Coordinating Commission, Bogdan Borusewicz, a member of the Presidium of the Gdansk Region from September 1980 until June of 1981 and a founding member in 1978 along with Lech Walesa of the Committee for Free Trade Unions, Aleksander Hall, a co-founder of the Movement of Young Poland and the journal Bratniak, and Leszek Swidek.]

The protest action called by the Gdansk Regional Coordinating Commission set for November 10 [the second anniversary of Solidarity's court registration in Warsaw] failed. It was the first such defeat of the underground Solidarity.

The following are, we think, the reasons for the strike's defeat:

First: The regime took unprecedented preventive measures that included:

a) The drafting into the army and ZOMO police of about one thousand workers from the major shipyards and factories in Gdansk and Gdynia and threatening to draft workers who participate in strikes and are marked by the management;

b) Preventive internments;

c) The introduction of military and police patrols within the factories and shipyards;

d) Threatening workers with harsh prison terms or dismissal from work;

e) The distribution of fake leaflets printed by the authorities that called off the strikes;

f) Deploying greater numbers of police at the places designated by Solidarity to be rallying points for demonstrations;

Second: The negative attitude of the Primate of Poland toward the protest actions called for by the T.K.K.;

Third: The short amount of time that passed between the strike protest on November 10 and the spontaneous general strike in Gdansk that took place immediately following the delegalization of Solidarity [October 10].

Under these conditions, successfully responding to the T.K.K. appeal was extremely difficult.

With great pleasure we received the news of the release of Lech Walesa, our union's elected leader. But let us not forget that thousands of people are today in prisons because they defended Solidarity and civil rights. Their number grows each day. In the Gdansk Region alone, 450 people have been arrested and sentenced [to prison terms of at least six months--Ed. note]. They are in the prisons of Gdansk, Potulice, and Fordon, and several dozen people are still interned in Trzebieline, Kwidzyn, Darlowek, and Lupkow.

page 4

"AN UNPRECEDENTED ACT IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZED SOCIETIES"

[The Temporary Coordinating Commission of Solidarity (TKK) issued a declaration on October 9 protesting the official dissolution of Solidarity. It called for a boycott of the new official trade unions to be established in its stead and for a nationwide four-hour general strike on November 10, the second anniversary of Solidarity's registration. Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, who was arrested in August is replaced by Piotr Bednarz, a member of the Wroclaw Regional Commission. It is taken from Z DNIA NA DZIEN (From Day to Day), issue #99 in Wroclaw, October 11-14, 1982.]

The dissolution of all trade unions, an unprecedented act in the history of civilized societies, is in effect an admission of defeat by the CROW (Military Council for National Salvation). Attempts to destroy the union movement did not succeed. Attempts to corrupt prominent union leaders did not succeed. For ten months of the state of war, an undivided workforce demonstrated against and resisted the regime of truncheons and generals. This self-appointed parliament, the very same which acquiesced to the creation of the CROW--an act contrary to the constitution of the Polish People's Republic--and the same Parliament which sanctioned the illegal decree of the Council of State imposing the state of war, dared to delegalize trade unions embracing ninety percent of the adult citizens of Poland, contradicting the will of its electorate.

The Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity may be dissolved only by the decision of its members. Our union exists and will continue to fight for a self-governing Republic. The Temporary Coordinating Commission of Solidarity appeals to union members, to all working people, and to all trade unions to boycott the new fake trade unions. Let the refusal to join them be a nationwide referendum which will declare Polish society's opposition to the policy of repression, to the enslavement of the nation, to increasing poverty, to thirty seven years of catastrophic social and economic policies.

To break solidarity with the boycott is treason against the interests of the union movement. This will be the first referendum in the history of the Polish People's Republic the results of which the rulers will not be able to falsify.

Let November 10th, the second anniversary of the registration of the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity, become a day of protest. We call on all working people, whatever their trade union membership, to take part in a mass, nationwide protest against lawlessness and impoverishment. We proclaim a four-hour protest strike for November 10th, to start at 10 a.m. The strike must be prepared without exposing its leaders. The outcome of the protest will determine future strategy of the union.

Wladyslaw Hardek, Malopolska (Krakow)

Zbigniew Bujak, Mazowsze (Warsaw)

Bogdan Lis, Gdansk

Piotr Bednarz, Lower Silesia (Wroclaw)

Eugeniusz Szumiejko, Member of the Presidium of Solidarity's National Commission

page 5

"THE AIM OF THE LAW IS TO CREATE A LEGAL BASIS FOR REPRESSION"

[On October 25, the Polish Parliament (Sejm) adopted an "anti-parasite" law, common to the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries, which forcibly drafts or punishes unemployed workers. The intent is to repress those who have been dismissed from their jobs for union activity or who are being denied employment for that reason. The adoption of the law had been expected for some time and had been proposed to the Sejm in draft form in June. At that time, the Temporary Coordinating Commission of Solidarity issued a formal declaration opposing the adoption of the parasite law. It appeared in the Warsaw underground publication GLOS WOLNEGO ROBOTNIKA (Voice of the Free Worker), #4, June 21, 1982]

Concerning the introduction into the Sejm of the government's draft of a law concerning persons who avoid employment, the Temporary Coordinating Commission of Solidarity declares:

The supposed purpose of the law concerning persons who avoid employment is the introduction of legal means that will induce all able-bodied persons to undertake work, and will make it impossible for the unemployed to live on income from illegal sources.

The contents of the project, however, unequivocally show that it is not the purpose of the authorities to use this law to deal with the negative social phenomenon of a group of people who live without working. This problem can be solved only by a social policy, by improving the system of centers that provide care for alcoholics, by creating protected workplaces for the socially maladjusted. But it cannot be achieved through administrative coercion.

The true aim of this law is to create a legal basis for the continued repression of people dismissed from their jobs for union activity or political opposition, or those who are inconvenient to the management and authorities for other reasons. The impossibility of finding work according to qualifications and professional training will expose these people to the possible application of the provisions of this law against them. The project proposes to establish a register of unemployed persons, then to harass them by obliging the unemployed to report to the authorities every month, and finally to require that they file a declaration detailing the sources of their income. It is also possible to direct unemployed persons to compulsory public service for a two month period.

The proposed law violates the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, which does not impose a legal duty to work on its citizens. It is also an attempt to circumvent the prohibition of compulsory labor included in the international conventions ratified by Poland. In particular, it violates Article 2 of the ILO Convention #29 concerning obligatory or compulsory labor, Article 1 of the ILO Convention #105 concerning abolition of forced labor, Article 8 of the International Covenant on Human and Political Rights, and Article 6 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

The Temporary Coordinating Commission of Solidarity calls on union members to oppose the draft of this law in all public, professional, and private discussions.

At the same time, the TKK announces that in case this project is placed into law, it will bring before the ILO and the international trade union movement proposals to condemn the government of the Polish People's Republic for breaking the obligations it has undertaken.

Temporary Coordinating Commission of the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union, Solidarity

page 7

WHY I AM RETURNING TO POLAND

[On September 15, Jan Jozef Lipski, who had been in London since May for medical treatment of a severe heart condition, returned to Poland to face charges of "preparing for the overthrow of the Polish People's Republic," punishable by five years imprisonment to death. He was arrested within twenty four hours of his return. Lipski, before being allowed to go to London, was on trial for "organizing a strike" at the Ursus tractor factory outside of Warsaw. Despite warnings by numerous doctors that Lipski was in danger of dying from a heart attack, the court's doctors certified that he was fit to stand trial. Only in May was the trial suspended and was he allowed to leave for treatment in London, with the understanding that he would return. Since then, he has been charged along with other members of KOR with the crime of treason. One day before his departure for Poland, he explained his decision to return in the Polish emigre newspaper Dziennik Polski I Dziennik Zolnierza. (See Committee in Support of Solidarity REPORTS #s 3, 6, and 7.)]

My decision to return, despite the preparations in Warsaw for the KOR trial, seem so unwise to many of my friends that I must make an attempt to defend it.

First: I am returning because I had so decided when I was leaving for London in May 1982 for post-operative tests and treatment. Not much has changed during this time for me to abandon that intention.

The KOR trial, if it actually takes place, will have, in my opinion, great significance for the strengthening, creating, or perhaps even the weakening of certain ideas about the last several years of Poland's history. The decision to take part in such an event--and while I am in London that depends only on myself--does not seem senseless to me, even if only to speak at that trial.

Besides, it may be that the authorities will hold the trial behind closed doors or hold a "drumbeat court-martial," though I do not expect it. Even the latter may not be the worst scenario if it is appropriately used by our friends in the West.

This can, therefore, be described as a striving on my part for a confrontation, which is not always regarded well--especially in Poland--and I know that even for that reason many dazzlingly good Poles and people who understand the situation into its dizzying depths as well as the needs emanating from it--will regard me as a terrorist or something of that kind. God be with them. They always knew better than I what to do, not only when KOR was being organized but also before and after. Thus it will be to the end of my life and theirs.

I know one thing: that the accusations against us by the junta are absurd. And I do not want to agree that that absurdity, or fear of it, should determine whether or not I return to Poland. I want to stand up to absurdity--and not for the first time in my life.

I would not want to be treated as a naif who counts on being able to demonstrate absurdity to the opposite side. The opposite side knows this well enough; nothing needs to be proven to them. In spite of that, it can do with me and with my friends almost anything that it wants. Almost--for they still attach some weight to world opinion, and even to the opinion of their own society.

Are not those who are already in the clutches of the CROW [the Military Council of National Salvation, whose acronym, WRON means crow in Polish] sufficient to stand up to the absurdity? Of course they could manage without me. We will manage even better together.

KOR was an institution as well as an idea. One of the elements of its idea was that we would strive toward our aims without the use of force. One can say that it counts for little because we do not have force available. But it is not quite like that. Even a small group can use terror, much less such a large movement like KOR. [KOR officially dissolved in 1981 at the Solidarity Congress with 34 members.] Because we are against terror we will likely be presented as terrorists, in order to smear and confuse all that which constituted the credo of KOR.

KOR had, simply, two goals: democracy and independence, or rather independence and democracy, which should never be separated, and in today's Poland, cannot be. However, we have always understood that these are distant goals which must be accomplished step by step, in stages, by preparing the foundation for them. We did not fool anyone into believing that democracy and independence would be possible tomorrow--and we did not pretend that we were so strong as to be able to arrange the two for Poland by next Monday.

Thus, we struggled daily against abuses of the labor code, against lawlessness, and against stifling thought and information, propagated by censorship. We accomplished a great deal for laying the foundations for future independence and for democracy. In addition, more often than we raised patriotic cries, we cried out that Majewski, Chomicki, or Kozlowski was beaten up and we hurried to take care of the beaten person both out of love for one's neighbor and out of love of Poland.

And for what we did, they will judge us, though they will certainly pretend that it was for something else. It is worthwhile, and an honor, to participate in this great game for the memory of KOR. For it is not true that no one will believe "them."

KOR aroused much hatred and aversion not only in those who felt threatened by its work, but also in those in whom it evoked a bad conscience because they had been passive, and at times even in those who simply felt envy and anxiety that the growing authority of KOR was limiting their own ambitions.

I believe, however, that the majority of Poles will listen to every piece of news from the courtroom and will keep their fingers crossed for us and our families. Let them do this--not, however, with the thought of favorable verdicts, for these are or will be decided by the time the prosecutor reads the indictment.

They should keep their fingers crossed so that in these moments we do not lose courage, that nervousness does not paralyze the intellect, that memory serves when necessary, in order to make associations unerringly.

The CROW will do a great deal so that our voices are not heard. But they will be heard.

I also have an emotional motive for returning to Warsaw to the defendant's dock: I was there when KOR was born--I want to participate in its final chapter. I have written a book about KOR; maybe it will appear in time for the trial. But there will be no final chapter in it. Others should write it, in the underground and emigre press, in Polish and in other languages.

page 10

THOUGHTS ON A DIALOGUE WITH THE TERRORIST

[Maciej Poleski wrote the following article, which appeared in the 23rd issue of Mazowsze Weekly, dated August 1. Poleski advises the underground on how to conduct itself with the "terrorist," that is the martial -law communist regime.]

1. On December 13 the state attacked the society and took some hostages. The army-police-party-administrative apparatus adopted the tactics of terrorism, because as a representative of a minuscule minority it was otherwise unable to impose its ideas upon the majority, whose only trustworthy or authentic spokesman has been Solidarity.

The terrorists now propose: we shall free the hostages and shall stop threatening you with the use of arms if you abandon your actions, ideas and leaders. In a word, the terrorists will renounce terror if we renounce ourselves. Our answer must be clear and simple: no negotiations and no compromises with the terrorists.

2. To reach a compromise one does not need a willingness to compromise--one needs a will to fight. A compromise results from a confrontation and not from a discussion of social questions. One cannot compromise with a gun pressed against one's head, one can only surrender. However there is no reason for capitulation. This war is also a war of nerves. It has become obvious that the terrorist is as afraid of the gunshots as we are. The slogans "Who wants peace must prepare for war!" and "War is a continuation of politics carried out by other means!" should be placed above the bed of every Solidarity activist.

3. After seven months of its war against the nation, it is clear that the regime's tactics are geared for a repetition of the post-Yalta farce. Gradually lifting the restrictions of the state of war the government wants to force us to resign ourselves and give up resistance in exchange for a promise of non-repression. This is a grotesque imitation of the Stalinist method of encouraging the Home Army to come out in the open in order to...treacherously liquidate it. The tactics are obvious: to isolate the elite of the Solidarity movement; to disarm the action by depriving it of its leaders; to punish those active in the underground and not those who are passive members in the union.

4. The slogans of national accord lead the whole discussion astray. Compromise suggests voluntary concessions from both sides given certain conditions. When the whole nation is being terrorized by the state, in such a situation a voluntary compromise is fictitious: one side has declared and continues to wage a civil war. As long as we merely keep threatening that we are going to answer a blow with a blow, and we restrain ourselves from doing it in the name of superior reasons, the terrorist will not relent.

The Polish self-limiting revolution ended when our adversary stopped limiting himself. Kuron is right: it is only by attacking the centers of power and coercion that we can force the adversary to make concessions.

5. In the present situation there is nothing more dangerous than simplistic thinking about organization: the top decides what to do, and the masses establish how to do it. It is precisely the opposite: the Temporary Coordinating Commission (T.K.K.) should decide how to exert pressure on the government using stronger means than the distribution of the underground press or the boycott of the mass media; and how to attack the apparatus of coercion. The center of resistance can and should determine how we should react to the release of most of the terrorist's interned hostages. While he continues to jail illegally, let us say, 200 internees, he implies that there is no point in quibbling about 200 people, although the rest of the prisoners are being [silently] convicted in court.

The answer to the question "how?" should--in my opinion--be as follows: a limited terror should be answered by limited retaliation, but not with counter-terror. One should destroy the material foundation for the apparatus of violence and its symbols. One should establish social juries to brand collaboration.

6. The basic question concerning strategy is "how?" However, on the level of groups of a few dozen people, the essential problem is "what." There is no point in building organization for its own sake, a system of networks for the sake of a system of networks. These organizations are being created for specific purposes and not for their own sake. A specific and successful action against the terrorists will bring about integrity and strength to the group, it will help in overcoming individual fear of the seemingly omnipotent regime. Perseverance and courage, conspiracy when the terrorist cannot reach us, blows administered stealthily, clandestine pestering--all these undermine the rule of fear. Our arms go numb from being raised, but he, too, must hold his gun.

7. How, then, should we fight against Russia and "Grand Duke" Jaruzelski? One needs strength. One has to reclaim our army, one has to help it to organize itself from within. An uprising? No, what for? It is enough to paralyze the "pacifiers," to deprive them of the will to fight against the society. One should not rise against the army, but carry on work within it. We should not count on the instinct of national loyalty at the moment of trial, when Polish soldiers are ordered to face Polish workers. We should anticipate any such moment by supporting the growing dissatisfaction and embitterment among the army officers who must play the role of occupier.

8. Moscow is much more afraid of the solidarity of captive nations than of solidarity among the Poles alone. We should therefore emphasize the former and spread the epidemic of freedom beyond the bars of the Polish section of the camp. We shall not be able to find an isolated place for independent Poland between the Germans and the Russians, nations which for the last 200 years have been stronger and larger than we. No general strike, even a successful one in the short run, will be able to remove Poland from its borders between the Bug and the Oder. The Finlandization of Poland is an illusion similar to 19th century dreams about the self-rule of the Russian nation. The choice is different: either Eastern Europe will be free or the whole West will end up becoming Finlandized.

9. Conspiracy has never been a mass movement. Half of Poland may weave plots, but 10 million people cannot be members of a conspiracy. Home Army (A.K.) soldiers numbered about 1% of the adult population. The essential thing is to incorporate within the movement everyone according to his or her abilities. Tens of "above ground" citizens should cooperate with every underground activist. Both sides should be aware of the limitations of their activity and of their mutual interdependence. Fighting Poland [the symbol of the resistance to the German occupation] should be supported by the whole Solidarity movement.

This double life is what we really have to strive to preserve until victory. Except for the small circle of our close associates, our activity should remain anonymous. If our identities and structure remain secret our gradual emergence to the surface is safe and does not carry the danger of exposure. By all means we have to preserve the underground life, which will enable us to control the Reds. It is our conspiracy that will force the rulers to concessions.

10. Another answer to the question of how to fight is the awareness that the underground Solidarity movement can work parallel to the Church, but it cannot follow the Church in joining efforts in the day by day struggle. The aims of the Church are eternal, ours are earthly. The Church is expected to last through generations. If Poland is to survive, every generation has to renew its sacrifice.

We should not blame the Church for defending its power and its interests. But we cannot surrender the independence of our social movement in the name of unity of action. We cannot subordinate ourselves to the Church.

The Church welcomes a setting in which it maintains an unquestionable authority over souls without losing any of its influence. In revolutionary situations, it can achieve this only by trying to make the society refrain from struggle--this was precisely the message of Cardinal Wyszynski's homily in Jasna Gora on the eve of the signing of the Gdansk Agreements in August 1980, and this also seems to be the policy of Primate Glemp. If the Church preserves its moderation and we our radicalism, then both sides--acting independently of each other, but parallel to each other, in the same direction--will make it more difficult for the government to continue its policy of terror.

11. In deciding what various organizations of underground Solidarity should do, one must, first of all, answer the question whether an uncontrolled outburst of social anger is really what we should most fear. With a situation in which there exists a political center of underground Solidarity, a spontaneous outburst does not pose a danger. Even the surprising demonstration of social strength on May 3 may be used (but unfortunately it was not) for political advantage. It is worth remembering that an uncontrolled explosion is not synonymous with a spontaneous outburst, but with one that lacks a properly formulated and attainable goal.

12. The authors of "The State of War and Mass Resistance" claim that the general strike, even if successfully launched, will not paralyze the government because it would not strike at its main instrument--the apparatus of terror and violence. December 13 showed the limit of effectiveness of a general strike strategy.

In August (1980) neither the army nor militia used arms since there was nobody to give orders to this effect. The authorities were paralyzed, there was no political center which would take effective action.

We can resort to a strike, but not if we proclaim it as open-ended, lasting until victory. Just as one does not shoot until victory, but rather as long as the ammunition lasts. If we intend to fight until victory we cannot begin at the end: discharging all ammunition in one salvo. One can sing "this is going to be our last battle," but one cannot plan for it.

13. Except for concrete and obvious situations, when we can be sure of the full participation of the society, one should avoid frontal clashes. We should adopt guerrilla methods, surprising the enemy but not engaging him in an open battle. The continuity of our movement will be secured by actions like "Radio Solidarity" broadcasts, placing granite plaques commemorating the death of the murdered Wujek mine miners, laying the floral cross on Victory Square in Warsaw, the June 13 "bath" of the ZOMO police in Wroclaw [when people threw objects and water at the police from apartment windows], or "stealing" the wounded Narozniak from a Warsaw hospital [see CSS Reports Issue #4].

14. Our very existence is a threat to the rulers. The strength of a totalitarian regime lies in its absolute control of the means of social communication, in the atomization of society, and in making impossible its self-organization, without the knowledge and consent of the authorities. A necessary but not sufficient condition for building the underground state and society is "paper ammunition" from a Kelus song. Independent culture provided the basis for the leaders of August to emerge. Searching for answers to the question of what should the underground do, one should not forget about the known and still sensible one: it should continue to produce underground literature which is still in insufficient supply, and which the Poles lacked during the first period of Sovietization of Poland during 1944-48.

15. This double life will enable us to achieve our aims, not only in our struggle, but also in our work. It will enable us to work out a positive program of cooperation with all those who want to build elements of a new order and not perpetuate the old one. Individual farmers, private entrepreneurs, cooperatives, and craftsmen must be convinced that their efforts have the full support of the opposition, and looked at as the basis for economic independence.

16. The pre-August opposition proved how much can be achieved by a few people. For someone who sees the liberation of Polish society as a process and not as a single act, the period of Solidarity was a dramatic leap forward. Today the emotional temperature has cooled down. However, seen from the pre-August perspective the present situation cannot but be judged as very good. We have extensive influence in all strata of society. We have the leadership. We have an impressive underground press--we won the battle for freedom of speech.

17. The silence of 10 million people is also a form of dialogue. The only dialogue possible today. The only social agreement that we need now is internal: to decide how and by what means we intend to fight state terrorism. About negotiations and peace offers we shall think only after battles are won.

AttachmentSize
Issue-9.doc57.5 KB

Reply

The content of this field is kept private and will not be shown publicly.
CAPTCHA
This question is for testing whether you are a human visitor and to prevent automated spam submissions.
Incorrect please try again
Enter the words above: Enter the numbers you hear: